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SURVEY OF UNITED STATES JURISDICTION
OVER HIGH SEAS NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the last decade, the United States has significantly expanded
its jurisdiction over vessels trafficking in illegal narcotics on the high
seas. The present law providing jurisdiction over vessels engaged in
narcotics trafficking is the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act of
1986.' The 1986 Act was "intended to reach acts of possession,
manufacture, or distribution committed outside the territorial juris-
diction of the United States." ' 2 Congress designed the 1986 Act3 to
eliminate many of the problems encountered in enforcing the pre-
ceding 1980 Marijuana on the High Seas Act 4 and the 1970 Com-
prehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act.
This paper surveys the past and present United States law of
jurisdiction over high seas narcotics traffickers. The legislative and
judicial developments which led to the 1986 Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act, as well as decisions since the 1986 Act, are reviewed
and critiqued. For each jurisdiction-granting provision of the 1986
Act, the applicable basis of jurisdiction under international law is
discussed. Provisions of the 1986 Act which are in apparent conflict
with customary international law are presented. And finally, the
author's conclusions are provided.
II. RECENT HISTORY OF HIGH SEAS JURISDICTION
Prior to the 1980 Marijuana on the High Seas Act, federal pro-
secutors looked to 1970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act to obtain jurisdiction over vessels and persons engaged
I Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3302, section 3201-3202 (codified at 46 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1901-1903) (West Supp. 1988) [hereinafter 1986 Act].
2 46 U.S.C.A. § 1903(h) (West Supp. 1988).
1 S. REP. No. 530, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6000.
4 .Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159 (1980) (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 955a-
d (West Supp. 1981)).
1 Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified at various sections of 21
U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1970 Comprehensive Act].
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in high seas narcotics trafficking.6 Due to a drafting oversight, the
proscriptive U.S. Code provisions which implemented the 1970 Com-
prehensive Act did not directly prohibit the possession of narcotics
on the high seas. 7 The most effective method of prosecution under
the 1970 Act was to charge defendants with conspiracy to import
illegal narcotics into the United States.8 The conspiracy offenses,
however, required the prosecutution to establish the difficult-to-prove
element of intended territorial effects (intent to distribute in the United
States). 9 All too often, the Coast Guard, unable to prove intent to
distribute in the United States, could confiscate the vessel and drugs
but could not prosecute the crew.' 0 The traffickers considered the
occasional loss of a vessel to be merely an acceptable cost of doing
business.II
To improve interdiction and prosecution efforts, Congress enacted
the 1980 Marijuana On the High Seas Act.12 The 1980 Act directly
proscribed the manufacture, distribution, or possession of controlled
substances aboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United
6 Note, High Seas Narcotics Smuggling and Section 955a of Title 21: Overex-
tension of The Protective Principle of International Jurisdiction, 50 FORDHAM L.
REv. 688, 700 (1982) [hereinafter Note, High Seas Narcotics Smuggling].
7 Id. at 701; S. REP. No. 855, 96th Cong. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADnmiN. NEWS 2785 ("[The 1970 Act] inadvertently contained a section repealing
the criminal provision under which drug smugglers apprehended on the high seas
were prosecuted without creating a new provision to replace it."); Anderson, Ju-
risdiction Over Stateless Vessels On The High Seas, 13 J. MAR. L. & Com. 323,324
(1982) [hereinafter Anderson, Jurisdiction].
I Note, High Seas Narcotics Smuggling, supra note 6, at 703; see, e.g., United
States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 865 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832
(1979)(defendants convicted of conspiring to import marijuana into the United States
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1976), and of conspiring to possess marijuana with
intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976)).
9 S. REP. No. 855, 96th Cong. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADwMN.
NEws 2785 ("In most cases, evidence to prove importation or conspiracy beyond a
reasonable doubt is impossible to obtain.").
I0 d.;. Anderson, Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 325-326 ("The United States
Attorney's Office was forced to decline prosecution in almost fifty percent of the
seizures made by the Coast Guard during the period September 1, 1976 - March
28, 1979, and the number of successful prosecutions declined steadily.").
11 S. REP. No. 855, 96th Cong. 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2785 ("[The] Coast Guard is able to seize and confiscate the ship and the
illegal drugs, but the Government is not able to prosecute the crew or others involved
in the smuggling operation. Such actions have little deterrent effect on the crews or
the trafficking organizations. In the highly lucrative trade in illegal drugs such
occasional seizures are considered a part of the cost of doing business.").
12 Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159 (1980) (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 955a-d
(West Supp. 1981)).
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States with intent to distribute the substance (intent to distribute in
the United States was not required). 3 Federal courts were enabled
to exercise jurisdiction over United States citizens aboard any vessel,
foreign nationals aboard United States vessels, stateless vessels on
the high seas, and vessels in "customs waters" of the United States.' 4
Though effective in improving prosecution efforts, 5 the language and
judicial interpretations of the 1980 Act caused sufficient difficulties
that Congress replaced the 1980 Act with the 1986 Maritime Drug
Law Enforcement Act.' 6
III. MARITmE DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1986
The 1986 Act prohibits the intentional or knowing manufacture,
distribution, or possession with intent to distribute, of a controlled
substance by any person on board
(1) a vessel of the United States;
(2) a vessel without nationality or a vessel assimilated to a vessel
without nationality;
(3) a vessel registered in a foreign nation where the flag nation
consents to the enforcement of the laws of the United States;
(4) a vessel located within the "customs waters" of the United
States; and
(5) a vessel in the territorial waters of another nation, where that
nation consents to the enforcement of the laws of the United States. 17
Conspiracies and attempts to accomplish prohibited acts are also
proscribed by the Act.18 Though the scope of jurisdiction under the
1986 Act is essentially similar to that under the 1980 Act, numerous
changes were made in the later statute to aid government prosecutors.
A. General Considerations - The 1986 Act
Trafficking in illegal narcotics is widely condemned in the inter-
national community.' 9 However, it is not yet a crime, like piracy,
13 Id.
14 Id.
"1 S. REP. No. 530, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADmiN. NEWS 6000 ("That law [1980 Act] significantly improved the U.S. ability
to prosecute drug smugglers, particularly foreign offenders, who before its enactment
were virtually all deported or repatriated to their countries of origin without pun-
ishment.').
16 Id.
-1 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1903(a)-(c)(West Supp. 1988) (Appendix 1 reproduces the entire
1986 Act).
" 46 U.S.C.A. § 1903(j)(West Supp. 1988).
19 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, art. 35, 18 U.S.T. 1408,
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over which the universality principle of international law provides
jurisdiction for all nations. 20 Through the 1986 Act, the United States
has manifested a policy of aggressive exertion of extraterritorial ju-
risdiction in order to reach illegal narcotics trafficking on the high
seas. Sections of the 1986 Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
which expand extraterritorial jurisdiction and facilitate prosecution
efforts are discussed in the following paragraphs.
1. Standing to Raise Violations of International Law.
The intent of Congress in passing the 1980 Marijuana On The
High Seas Act was to extend United States jurisdiction in this area
to the maximum extent permitted by international law.2 ' Appellate
courts interpreted the 1980 Act to give defendants standing to litigate
the question of whether jurisdiction under the Act complied with
international law, or whether international law permitted the boarding
of vessels and enforcement of the law. 22 Litigating issues of inter-
national law in individual cases proved to be a significant burden
for the government. 2  To eliminate this burden, Congress passed
T.I.A.S. No. 6298; Law Of The Sea Convention, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, art. 108 [hereinafter 1982 LOS Convention]; United States v. Marino-Garcia,
679 F.2d 1373, 1382 n.16 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1114, 103 S.Ct.
748, (1983); See Note, The Judiciary and Public Policy Considerations of the Ma-
rijuana On The High Seas Act, 10 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L. L. J. 581, 593 n.47
(1986)(discussing the recent United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the
Control of Drug Trafficking, 24 I.L.M. 1157 (July 1985)).
10 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 19, at art. 105, ("On the high seas ... every
State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft . . . and arrest the persons and seize the
property on board."); Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29,
1958, art. 19, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200 (entered into force Sept. 30,
1962)[hereinafter 1958 Convention on the High Seas]; See United States v. Marino-
Garcia, 679 F.2d at 1382 n.16 ("There is a growing consensus among nations to
include drug trafficking as a universally prohibited crime.").
21 H.R. REP. No. 323, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1979) (The 1980 act was "designed
to prohibit all acts of illicit trafficking in controlled substances on the high seas
which the United States can reach under international law."); United States v.
Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1379-1380 (lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1114 (1983) ("Jurisdiction under [the 1980 Act] may not therefore exceed the bounds
of international law.... [W]e must endeavor to interpret [the 1980 Act] in a manner
consistent with international law"); See also Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy,
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("an act of Congress ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains .... ").
22 See, e.g., United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F.Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1981),
vacated as moot, 29 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2545 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d at 1378-79; United States v. Marsh, 747 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.
1984).
23 S. REP. No. 530, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6000-6001.
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section 1903(d) of the 1986 Act which prevents defendants from raising
alleged violations of international law in their defense: 24
A claim of failure to comply with international law in the enforce-
ment of this chapter may be invoked solely by a foreign nation,
and a failure to comply with international law shall not divest a
court of jurisdiction or otherwise constitute a defense to any pro-
ceeding under this chapter. 2
Section 1903(d) reflects the generally accepted principles that rights
and duties under international law accrue to sovereign states, and
that only a state can complain of a violation of international law. 26
As a result, defendants do not have standing to protest alleged
violations of international law, nor does the United States have to
prove compliance with international law. 27 This paper discusses whether
certain applications of section 1903(d) violate the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment.
It is interesting to note that unlike the 1980 Act, the Senate and
House Reports for the 1986 Act do not state that it is the intent of
Congress to expand jurisdiction in compliance with international law. 21
The Congress (undoubtedly with the help of the executive branch)
24 S. REP. No. 530, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS, 6000-6001 ("[dlefendants in cases involving foreign or stateless
yessel boardings and seizures have been relying heavily on international jurisdictional
questions as legal technicalities to escape conviction. ... In the view of the Com-
mittee, only the flag nation of a vessel should have a right to question whether the
Coast Guard has boarded the vessel with the required consent. The international
law of jurisdiction is an issue between sovereign nations. Drug smuggling is universally
recognized criminal behavior, and defendants should not be allowed to inject these
collateral issues into their trials... [Oinly a foreign nation may invoke a claim of
failure to comply with international law in the enforcement of the act.").
25 46 U.S.C.A. § 1903(d)(West Supp. 1988).
26 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
Part IX, Introductory Note 339 (1987)("[M]any obligations under international law
benefit private persons, . . . but the principal remedies for violation of these obli-
gations are interstate only; international private remedies for violations of inter-
national law are still rare."); United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 30 (1st Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983)("In brief, international law protects Hon-
duras, not [the individual defendant]. And Honduras, as far as this record reveals,
does not care.").
27 United States v. Bierman, 678 F.Supp. 1437,1442 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (In accor-
dance with section 1903(d), the court held that the defendant lacked standing to
raise the issue of whether the Coast Guard complied with the terms of an agreement
between the United States and the United Kingdom.)
21 S. REP. No. 530, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6000; H. REP. No. 99-547 (1986).
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appears to have made a decisive effort not to allow the international
law of jurisdiction to restrict United States drug interdiction activities
under the 1986 Act.
2. Intent to Distribute in the United States Not Required
The proscriptive provision of the 1986 Act, section 1903(a), makes
it illegal knowingly to manufacture, distribute or possess with intent
to distribute a controlled substance on board vessels subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.2 9 The Act proscribes possession with
intent to distribute, but does not require an intent to distribute in
the United States.
Under the provisions of the 1970 Comprehensive Act, prosecutors
found it difficult to prove the required element of intent to distribute
in the United States.30 Congress first eliminated the need for such a
specific geographic nexus (intent to distribute in the United States)
in the 1980 Act. 3' Congress concluded after hearing the testimony of
interested law enforcement agencies that exercising jurisdiction with-
out a nexus was valid under international law.32 The courts have since
upheld the 1980 Act, holding that it is not necessary to prove an
intent to distribute in the United States in order to exercise jurisdiction
over foreign or stateless vessels. 3  The intent to distribute (presumably
29 46 U.S.C.A. § 1903(a)(West Supp. 1988).
30 Note, High Seas Narcotics Smuggling, supra note 6, at 713 ("Because of the
difficulty of proving such intent, many indictments were thrown out, and although
the narcotics were destroyed and the ships impounded, the smugglers themselves
went free.").
" 21 U.S.C.A. § 955a(a) (West Supp. 1981); See 125 CONG. REc. H6380 (July
23, 1979)(Statement of Rep. McCloskey: "Where current law requires an intent to
import a controlled substance into the United States as a necessary element of the
crime this bill essentially requires only knowledge or intent to distribute with no
need to establish a U.S. destination.").
32 United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 369-71 (4th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 874 ("[C]ongress, in enacting section 955a(a) was acutely aware
of applicable international law and enacted that provision pursuant to its under-
standing that the United States had jurisdiction to create a crime proscribing pos-
session of a controlled substance with a general intent to distribute by any person
aboard a stateless vessel on the high seas." The court cited the Department of
Transportation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Attorney Generals Office,
and the Department of State as agencies whose testimony led Congress to conclude
that jurisdiction could be exercised without a nexus between a stateless vessel and
the United States.).
13 United States v. Alvarez-Mena, 765 F.2d 1259, 1265 (5th Cir. 1985)("No
showing of nexus or knowledge or intent is required where jurisdiction is predicated
on the stateless status of the vessel on the high seas."); United States v. Pinto-
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anywhere) is routinely inferred from the possession of a large quantity
of illegal narcotics, combined with factors such as length of voyage,
lack of provisions or equipment, and number and relation of the
crew.3"
3. Foreign State Consent May Be Obtained By Informal Means
The 1986 Act3" codified judicial interpretations of the 1980 Act
which allowed the consent of a foreign state to the enforcement of
United States law to be obtained by radio, telephone, or similar oral
or electronic means.3 6 Foreign state consent may be proved by cer-
tification from the Secretary of State.3 7 The validity of obtaining
consent through informal means according to international law is
discussed in section IV of this paper.
IV. GROUNDS FOR HIGH SEAS JURISDICTION - THE 1986 ACT
1. United States Vessels
The law-of-the-flag principle permits a state to exercise jurisdiction
over all persons aboard vessels flying the state's flag.3" Authorities
Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 261 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[I]nternational law provides no bar to
an assertion of jurisdiction over a stateless vessel by the United States pursuant to
955a(a), even absent proof that the vessel's operators intended to distribute their
cargo in the United States."); See United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931,939 (1 1th
Cir. 1985) (seizure of vessel of Honduran registry; "The protective principle does
not require that there be proof of an actual or intended effect inside the United
States.").
14 United States v. Batista, 731 F.2d 765, 768 (11th Cir. 1984); H.R. REP. No.
323, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979) ("[T]he intent to distribute need not be within
the United States. Moreover, the intent element may be inferred by proof of a
presence of a large quantity of the narcotic or dangerous drug, giving rise to the
inference of trafficking. . ."); See Note, The Judiciary and Public Policy Consid-
erations of the Marijuana On The High Seas Act, 10 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. J.
581, 587 n.28 (1986).
46 U.S.C.A. § 1903(c)(1)(E) (West Supp. 1988).
36 United States v. Loalza-Vasquez, 735 F.2d 153, 157-158 (5th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d at 933 ("[A]rrangements regarding specific vessels may
be informal, as long as there is a clear indication of consent by the foreign nation.").
37 46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(1)(West Supp. 1988); S. REP. No. 530, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 16, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMM-. NEWS 6001 ("Such a
certification should spell out the circumstances in which the consent, waiver, or
denial was obtained, including the name and title of the foreign official acting on
behalf of his government, the precise time of the communication, and the means
by which the communication was conveyed.").
38 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 502, reporters' note 3 (1987);
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 585, 73 S.Ct. 921 (1953); United States v. Del
Sol, 679 F.2d 217 (11th Cir. 1982).
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differ as to whether the law-of-the-flag theory is a corollary of the
nationality principle39 or of the territorial principle.4 The better view
is that it is a corollary of the territorial principle. 41
Jurisdiction over the "territory" of the vessel includes within its
scope all persons aboard the vessel.4 2 If the law-of-the-flag principle
were considered a corollary of the nationality principle, it would be
difficult to justify exercising jurisdiction over foreign citizens aboard
the vessel. In practice, the United States routinely enforces its laws
against all persons aboard United States flag vessels on the high seas
and in foreign territories.4 1
Section 1903(b) of the 1986 Act defines which vessels are considered
a "vessel of the United States" and therefore subject to United States
jurisdiction. Vessels which once were documented in the United States
and subsequently were changed to a foreign registry in violation of
United States law remain vessels of the United States for purposes
of the Act."
2. Stateless Vessels
Congressional intent in both the 1980 and 1986 Acts was to provide
for jurisdiction over foreign crew members aboard stateless vessels
on the high seas. 45 Section 1903(c)(1) of the 1986 Act states that
19 United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d at 1380 n.12 ("Under the nationality
or law of the flag principle, any nation may extend jurisdiction to all vessels flying
its flag.").
40 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 585, 73 S.Ct. 921 (1953); The S.S. Lotus,
P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10 at 25 (1927)("a ship on the high seas is assimilated to
the territory of the State the flag of which it flies. . . what occurs on board a vessel
on the high seas must be regarded as if it occurred on the territory of the State
whose flag the ship flies").
" See RIENOW, NATIONALITY OF A MERCHANT VESSEL, 189-191 (1937).
42 Reg. v. Anderson, L.R.1 C.C.R. 169 (1868) ("[Tlhe ship forms a part of that
nation's country, and all persons on board of her may be considered as within the
jurisdiction of that nation whose flag is flying on the ship, in the same manner as
if they were in the territory of that nation."); see also United States v. Del Sol,
679 F.2d 217, 218 (11th Cir. 1982).
41 United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 53 S.Ct. 580 (1933) (U.S. law applied
to an act aboard a United States vessel on the river Congo in Africa.); United States
v. Liles, 670 F.2d 989, 992 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Under well established principles of
international law, the jurisdiction of the United States to prosecute crimes on board
ship is concurrent with the jurisdiction of the nation in whose waters the crime
occurs."); United States v. Julio-Diaz, 678 F.2d 1031 (11th Cir. 1982).
46 U.S.C.A. § 1903(b)(3) (West Supp. 1988).
, 125 CONG. REC. 20,083 (1979) (comments of Rep. McCloskey: "[This bill
would exert jurisdiction over... [a]ny person, foreign or U.S. citizen, on board a
U.S. vessel or one subject to U.S. jurisdiction such as a stateless vessel."), cited in
10 MAR. LAW. 154, n.93 (1985).
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stateless vessels are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States:
For the purposes of this section, a "vessel subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States" includes-
(A) a vessel without nationality;
(B) a vessel assimilated to a vessel without nationality, in accordance
with paragraph (2) of article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the High
Seas;46
A "vessel without nationality" includes, but is not limited to
(A) a vessel aboard which the master or person in charge makes a
claim of registry, which claim is denied by the flag nation whose
registry is claimed; and
(B) any vessel aboard which the master or person in charge fails,
upon request of an officer of the United States empowered to enforce
applicable provisions of United States law, to make a claim of
nationality or registry for that vessel.
47
When a vessel is found transporting narcotics hundreds of miles
from the United States, a nexus or potential threat to the United
States as a forum is often difficult to prove.4 1 Under present United
States law, however, a finding that the vessel is stateless is itself
sufficient to establish the court's jurisdiction over the vessel and its
crew. 49 The appellate courts have "agreed uniformly that stateless
vessels on the high seas are, by virtue of their statelessness, subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States." 50 No nexus (intent to dis-
tribute in the United States) between the stateless vessel and the
United States is required."
6 1958 Convention on the High Seas, supra note 20, at art. 6(2) ("[A] ship
which sails under the flags of two or more States, using them according to con-
venience, may not claim any of the nationalities in question ... and may be
assimilated to a ship without nationality."); See, e.g., United States v. Ayarza-
Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1046 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Matute, 767 F.2d
1511,1512 (lth Cir. 1985).
47 46 U.S.C.A. § 1903(c)(2) (West Supp. 1988).
41 Anderson, Jurisdiction supra note 7, at 324-25 ("ITlhe high seas smugglers
soon learned that if no one said anything and all the charts and log books disappeared
before a Coast Guard boarding, the chances of a successful prosecution were slim.").
49 United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d at 1383 ("Jurisdiction exists solely
as a consequence of the vessel's status as stateless."); United States v. Pinto-Mejia,
720 F.2d 248, 261 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Alvarez-Mena, 765 F.2d 1259,1265
(5th Cir. 1985).
50 United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d at 261.
5' Id. at 260-61; United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363,372 (4th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1982); United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d at 1383
("We further conclude that there need not be proof of a nexus between the stateless
vessel and the country seeking to effectuate jurisdiction.").
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The exercise of subject matter jurisdiction 2 over the foreign crew
members of stateless vessels without proof of a nexus to the forum
has generated extensive controversy. The 1980 Act and cases inter-
preting it have been criticized insofar as they authorize jurisdiction
of a forum over foreign crew members aboard stateless vessels when
there is no potential threat to or nexus with the forum, in contra-
vention of international law.53
The critics maintain that
1) Congress intended the expansion of jurisdiction under the
1980 Act to conform to the international law of jurisdiction;5 4
2) According to international law, extraterritorial jurisdiction
must be based on one of the existing principles of jurisdiction;55
3) The protective principle of jurisdiction (the principle most
applicable to stateless vessels56) requires a threat to the forum's
security or governmental functions;5 7 and
52 In personam jurisdiction is not an issue. The United States Supreme Court's
Ker-Frisbie doctrine holds that a defendant can not challenge jurisdiction over his
person on the grounds that his presence was unlawfully obtained. Frisbie v. Collins,
342 U.S. 519,522 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1886).
13 See Note, High Seas Narcotics Smuggling, supra note 6, at 700-16; Note, Stateless
Vessels and The High Seas Narcotics Trade: United States Courts Deviate From
International Principles of Jurisdiction, 9 MAR. LAW. 273 (1984) [hereinafter Note,
Stateless Vessels]; Note, The Marijuana on the High Seas Act and Jurisdiction over
Stateless Vessels, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 313 (1983).
14 Supra note 21.
11 Note, High Seas Narcotics Smuggling, supra note 6, at 690 ("In order to assert
jurisdiction over an offense, a State must apply one of the bases of international
jurisdiction: universality, nationality, passive personality, objective territoriality or
the protective principle."), citing Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882,885 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967); Note, Stateless Vessels, supra note 53,
at 275.
16 United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F.Supp. 1340, 1344 n.6 (S.D. Fla. 1981),
vacated as moot, 29 Crim. L. Rep (BNA) 2545 (5th Cir. 1981) ("International law
recognizes five possible theories of jurisdiction, the objective territorial, national,
protective, universal, and passive personality principles.").
The objective territorial principle requires a showing that the defendant intended to
harm the forum state and that such harm occurred; the nationality principle does
not apply to foreign nationals; the United States does not recognize the passive
personality principle as a basis of jurisdiction; the law-of-the-flag theory (a corollary
of the territorial principle) does not apply because stateless vessels are not U.S.
vessels; and drug smuggling is not yet recognized as a universal crime. See Note,
Drug Enforcement On The High Seas: Stateless Vessel Jurisdiction Over Shipboard
Criminality By Non-Resident Alien Crewmembers, 11 MAR. LAW. 163,171 n.54
(1986); [hereinafter Note, Drug Enforcement On The High Seas]; Note, Stateless
Vessels, supra note 53, at 275-77.
11 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
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4) To fulfill the intent of Congress to expand jurisdiction in
accordance with international law, such a nexus between the
crew member and the forum state is necessary to exercise
jurisdiction under the protective principle."
The decision of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida in United States v. Angola59 illustrates the com-
mentators' criticisms. In its haste to exercise jurisdiction, the court
held that a vessel carrying narcotics 350 miles from United States
territory with no nexus to the United States other than its location
posed such a threat to the United States that jurisdiction over the
crew was justified under the protective principle.60 The Angola court
was apparently ready to consider every narcotics-carrying vessel on
the high seas anywhere in the western hemisphere to be a potential
threat sufficient for the court to exercise jurisdiction over it.61
Contrary to the court's opinion, 62 the threat posed by a narcotics-
carrying vessel 350 miles from the United States coast, when no other
evidence of intent to import is present, is generalized and attenuated.
Grounding jurisdiction on such a generalized potential threat creates
a slippery slope which exposes the protective principle to unlimited
abuse in the future. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
provides that a state is authorized to exercise jurisdiction under the
protective principle when "certain conduct outside its territory by
persons not its nationals [is] directed against the security of the state
or against a limited class of other state interests. ' 63 Thus, the de-
fendant's conduct must be directed against the security of the state
402, comment (f) (1987); See, e.g., United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d at 1154
("The protective principle permits a nation to assert jurisdiction over a person whose
conduct outside the nation's territory threatens the nation's security or could po-
tentially interfere with the operation of its governmental functions."); United States
v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8,10 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968).
S8 Note, Stateless Vessels, supra note 53, at 293; Note, High Seas Narcotics
Smuggling, supra note 6, at 719.
59 514 F.Supp. 933 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
60 Id. at 936.
63 Id. at 935 (" To protect the nation's borders from the importation of illegal
narcotics, it is necessary to attempt regulation of vessels on the high seas notwith-
standing the absence of any objective proof of an intent to import into the United
States.").
62 Id. ("This vessel, full of marijuana, represented a real, not an imaginary,
potential for harm to the effective administration of the United States' customs and
narcotics laws").
63 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
402(3) (1987).
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for the protective principle to apply. In Angola, however, the court
exercised jurisdiction without proof that the defendant's conduct was
directed against the United States (intended territorial effects). 64 The
court's exercise of jurisdiction without proof of intended territorial
effects was an unwarranted application of the protective principle. 65
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
quickly remedied the faulty jurisdictional analysis of the Angola case.
In United States v. James-Robinson,6 the court recognized that it
did not have subject matter jurisdiction unless such jurisdiction was
permitted under international law. The court held that under the
protective principle of jurisdiction it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to hear charges against foreign nationals on a stateless vessel carrying
narcotics where the ship was seized 400 miles from the United States
and the government did not allege an intent to distribute or to cause
any other effect in the United States. 67 The court ruled:
[T]he presence of foreign crewmen on a stateless ship carrying
marijuana on the high seas 400 miles from the United States [does
not] by definition represent a threat to our national security or to
our government functions... More than that must be alleged and
proven. 61
The James-Robinson court properly held that the protective principle
requires a greater nexus between the defendant and the forum than
mere presence of the defendant off the forum coast. 69
The United States law of jurisdiction over stateless vessels changed
dramatically in the landmark case of United States v. Marino-Garcia.70
In Marino-Garcia, the Eleventh Circuit held that the United States
1 514 F.Supp. at 936.
65 Note, Bringing In The Mother Lode; The Second Circuit Rides In The Wake
of Marino-Garcia - United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 10 MAR. LAW. 141,154 (1985);
Note, High Seas Narcotics Smuggling, supra note 6, at 716 ("The [Angola] decision
... exceeds the limit of the protective principle with its requirements of a potentially
adverse effect caused by conduct directed at the security of the State.").
515 F.Supp. 1340, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 1981); See also United States v. Egan, 501
F.Supp. 1252,1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
67 515 F.Supp. at 1347.
61 Id. at 1346.
69 Id. at 1345. ("Never in a published opinion of an American court has a
potential generalized effect, which might or might not also be an effect on the
United States, been found sufficient to invoke the protective principle of international
law."); See Note, Stateless Vessels, supra note 53, at 290.




does have subject matter jurisdiction over foreign nationals on state-
less vessels where no intended territorial effect (nexus) can be proved. 7'
Rather than adopt the discredited practice of grounding jurisdiction
in the protective principle when there is no nexus to the forum, the
Eleventh Circuit fashioned a new ground for jurisdiction. The court
examined the status of stateless vessels under international law and
concluded that jurisdiction may be exercised over the stateless vessel
and its crew members solely as a result of the vessel's stateless status.72
In Marino-Garcia, the court engaged in an extensive analysis of
international law to support the conclusion that "there need not be
proof of a nexus between the stateless vessel and the country seeking
to effectuate jurisdiction. ' 73 Then, in a single sentence, the court
carelessly (or perhaps carefully) presumed that jurisdiction over the
vessel includes jurisdiction over its crew members: "Such status makes
the vessel subject to action by all nations proscribing certain activities
aboard stateless vessels and subjects those persons aboard to pros-
ecution for violating the proscriptions.7 4 In United States v. Pinto-
Mejia, the Second Circuit embraced the Eleventh Circuit's decision
in Marino-Garcia and likewise held that a finding that the vessel was
stateless is by itself sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the crew
members . 7
Criticism of the Marino-Garcia Decision
The Marino-Garcia decision, however, remains vulnerable to the
criticism that according to each of the recognized principles of in-
ternational jurisdiction a nexus between the individual defendant and
the forum is required. 76 This nexus requirement should apply no less
71 Id. at 1383.
72 Id. at 1382 ("Vessels without nationality are international pariahs. They have
no internationally recognized right to navigate freely on the high seas... they
represent 'floating sanctuaries from authority' and constitute a potential threat to
the order and stability of navigation on the high seas .... Thus the assertion of
jurisdiction over stateless vessels on the high seas in no way transgresses recognized
principles of international law."); See Note, Drug Enforcement On The High Seas,
supra note 56, at 173 (reviews the authorities of international law upon which the
court based its decision in Marino-Garcia).
71 679 F.2d at 1383.
14 Id. (emphasis added).
71 United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d at 248.
76 Note, Drug Enforcement On The High Seas, supra note 57, at 170 ("When
the [1980 Act] is applied to stateless vessels which carry alien crews, some connection
between the United States and the crime of drug smuggling must be shown in order
to support jurisdiction under one of the traditional jurisdictional principles."); Note,
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to persons aboard stateless vessels than to those aboard a vessel
registered in a foreign state. The Eleventh Circuit erred in its analysis
of the international law of jurisdiction when it presumed that juris-
diction over a stateless vessel automatically provides jurisdiction over
the vessel's foreign crew members. 77 Article 110(l)(d) of the Law of
the Sea Convention permits a state to exercise jurisdiction over a
stateless vessel, but does not provide for jurisdiction over the crew
members aboard the vessel. 78 The court in Marino-Garcia was correct
in asserting that any nation may extend its authority over a stateless
ship;79 the problem, however, concerns jurisdiction over individuals,
as opposed to an in rem proceeding against the ship as a separate
entity.80
Crew members of stateless vessels are not themselves stateless, but
are citizens of a foreign nation."' The five international principles of
jurisdiction might not limit a state's authority to exercise jurisdiction
over a stateless vessel, as maintained in Marino-Garcia8 2; however,
at least one of the principles should be satisfied to exercise jurisdiction
over the individuals aboard. 3 Each of the recognized principles of
international law requires a nexus or potential threat to the forum.
Stateless Vessels, supra note 53, at 278 ("[Elach of these principles requires some
type of nexus or connection with the prosecuting country, for example, citizenship
or the presence of a potential threat, for the extraterritorial extension of jurisdic-
tion.").
11 Note, Stateless Vessels, supra note 53, at 294, ("[The court] failed to distinguish
between jurisdiction over a stateless vessel and jurisdiction to prosecute crewmembers
found on board a stateless vessel.").
11 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 19, at art. 1 10(l)(d).
'9 MEYER, THE NATIONALITY OF SwiPs 323 (1967), cited in United States v. James-
Robinson, 515 F.Supp. at 1343 n.5.
90 United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F.Supp. at 1343 n.5 ("[tihe issue before
the Court is not of such an in rem nature. Rather, the issue is whether the U.S.
may extend its authority over the foreign citizen crewmembers of such a stateless
ship.").
"I MEYER, THE NATIONALITY OF SHns 309 (1967) ("Such statelessness does not
of course affect the nationality of the individuals using the ship in question.").
82 United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d at 1382 ("[T]he assertion of juris-
diction over stateless vessels on the high seas in no way transgresses recognized
principles of international law.").
11 Note, The Marijuana on the High Seas Act and Jurisdiction over Stateless
Vessels, 25 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 313, 333-34 (1983) ("A nation's authority to seize
a stateless vessel . . . does not mean that its courts automatically should hear cases
involving the vessel's foreign crewmembers. Stateless vessel status is not illegal, and
no court should try a case involving crewmembers of a stateless vessel unless the
crewmembers violate one of the nation's laws and the nation is able to invoke a
recognized principle of international law.").
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The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Marino-Garcia to exercise juris-
diction over crew members of stateless vessels without such a nexus
is in contravention of customary international law and therefore is
contrary to Congressional intent in passing the 1980 Act. 84 Crew
members of stateless vessels are in essence stripped of their nationality,
and of the protections afforded by international law.
Two additional criticisms of the practice of exercising jurisdiction
over foreign citizens on stateless vessels under Marino-Garcia and its
progeny merit consideration:
1. Under the law of Marino-Garcia, the United States, or any nation,
could theoretically claim jurisdiction over a stateless vessel and its
crew members anywhere in the world. 5
2. Such an exercise of jurisdiction contradicts the existing presumption
that the United States will conform to international law.16 In Murray
v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, the Supreme Court stated that "an
act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations, if any other possible construction remains.. -.8 The Fed-
eral courts have expanded this presumption by holding that the courts
may override international law only when Congress expressly intended
to do S0.88
Congress apparently recognized the difficulty of obtaining juris-
diction over stateless vessels under the protective principle. In re-
sponse, Congress included in the 1986 Act section 1902 which declares
that drug trafficking aboard vessels "presents a specific threat to the
security and societal well-being of the United States." 8 9 To the lay
reader this declaration appears to be mere rhetoric; however, to the
student of international law it raises a bright signal. This declaration
of a threat to the security of the United States allows a court to
84 Note, Stateless Vessels, supra note 53, at 295 ("This apparent unilateral ex-
tension of sovereignty over the high seas ... constitutes a violation of customary
international law and the Convention on the High Seas."); Note, High Seas Narcotics
Smuggling, supra note 6, at 719 ("Only by requiring that the narcotics possessed
are intended for distribution within the United States will subsection (a) of [the
1980 Marijuana On The High Seas Act] conform to principles of international
law.").
11 United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d at 1383 ("[W]e hold that section
955a properly extends the criminal jurisdiction of this country to any stateless vessel
in international waters engaged in the distribution of controlled substances.").
16 See Note, High Seas Narcotics Smuggling, supra note 6, at 692 n.21.
87 Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,118 (1804).
88 Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1981).
89 46 U.S.C.A. § 1902 (West Supp. 1988).
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hold that a stateless or foreign vessel carrying narcotics, with no
nexus to the United States, poses such a threat to the security of the
United States that jurisdiction over the vessel and crew members is
proper under the protective principle. 90 As observed earlier in the
discussion of United States v. Angola,9' however, the exercise of
jurisdiction over foreign crew members aboard a stateless vessel when
there is no nexus is an abuse of the protective principle.
Argument For Exercising Jurisdiction Under Marino-Garcia.
An argument can be made that the United States is justified in
exercising jurisdiction over crew members aboard stateless vessels
where no nexus is present. International law is continuously developing
and must expand in order to meet the threat of serious crimes such
as high seas narcotics trafficking. The failure of existing international
law to provide states with jurisdiction over such a threat need not
be controlling.
The primary limitation on the reach of jurisdiction under the
protective principle is that assertions of this jurisidiction must be
reasonable. 92 If the United States unreasonably extends its extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction other nations will object. 93 If the United States
actions are not objected to, or are followed by other nations, such
practices will become accepted by the international community and
over time will become customary international law.94
90 See United States v. Biermann, 678 F.Supp. 1437 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (court
refered to section 1902 of the 1986 Act in holding that the protective principle
provides jurisdiction over persons on foreign vessels outside U.S. territory); United
States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d at 1378 n.4 (in dicta the court stated: "[W]e
note that if drug trafficking is found to be a threat to the security of the United
States this country would have jurisdiction under the protective principle over all
vessels engaged in the illicit practice .... ).
11 Supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
92 Church v. Hubbard, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234-35 (1804); United States v.
Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983).
91 Internal Coast Guard Memorandum (undated) ("[T]he limits upon the exercise
of prescriptive jurisdiction by the United States under the protective principle are
determined not by fixed boundaries but by the acceptance or acquiescence of other
nations based on the reasonableness of our actions.").
See Anderson, Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 331 citing McDougal, The Hydrogen
Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 356, 358
(1955) ("[Tlhe international law of the sea is ... a process of continuous interaction,
of continuous demand and response, in which the decision-makers of particular
nations unilaterally put forward claims of the most diverse and conflicting character
to the use of the world's seas, and in which other decision-makers . . . weigh and
appraise these competing claims in terms of the interest of the world community
and of the rival claimants, and ultimately accept or reject them.").
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The United States may also defend its practice of aggressive ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction in light of the ever increasing international
condemnation of illicit narcotics trafficking. The international com-
munity has developed a consensus concerning the need to control the
illegal use and distribution of drugs. 95 Recently, the United Nations
has called for even greater international cooperation and interdiction
efforts. 96 Aggressive interdiction and prosecution efforts by the United
States are in accord with this international call to stop narcotics
trafficking.
A third argument available to the United States is that the com-
mentators' criticisms are premised on the legal fiction of "in rem"
jurisdiction which separates jurisdiction over the vessel from juris-
diction over the vessel's operators. In rem jurisdiction over a vessel
is part of a lien theory which allows an action against the vessel
itself to ensure that the owner's or operator's debts are paid. 97 The
vessel may be seized and sold in an in rem proceeding to satisfy
maritime liens.
Criminal subject matter jurisdiction should not be limited by this
legal fiction designed to provide security for maritime claims. It may
be argued that the Eleventh Circuit in Marino-Garcia correctly held
that jurisdiction over the vessel includes jurisdiction over its crew
members. 9 After all, the crew members and not the vessel are re-
sponsible for the vessel carrying narcotics. A vessel transporting
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S.
No. 6298 (entered into force June 24, 1967) (requires signatories to take steps to
control illegal narcotics trafficking); 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 19, at art.
108 (requires all states to cooperate in the suppression of illicit drug trafficking).
16 See U.N. General Assembly Resolutions on the Control of Drug Trafficking
and Draft Convention Against Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
and Related Activities, art 9, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1157, 1158 (July 1985) ("The
States Parties shall cooperate on a bilateral and multilateral basis to prevent and
suppress the illicit activities ... and take all necessary measures towards that end.");
Note, The Judiciary and Public Policy Considerations of the Marijuana On The
High Seas Act, 10 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. J. 581 n.47 (1986) ("The general tenor
of [recent United Nations activity] is a renewed pledge to fight the plague of illicit
traffic in drugs with greater cooperation among nations.").
97 T. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 61 (1987) ("A proceeding in
rem in admiralty is one against the vessel (or other maritime property) as the offending
thing, although as a practical matter in most cases it is a way of obtaining security
for the plaintiff's claim.").
9' See United States v. Alvarez-Mena, 765 F.2d 1259, 1266 (5th Cir. 1985)
("[Miembers of the crew of a stateless vessel on the high seas have no basis on
which to assert any claim to the jurisdictional exemptions of international law that
are unavailable to the vessel upon which they sail.").
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narcotics is but a an instrument, a structure of steel and wood, under
the control and direction of its crew members.
Stateless Vessels and the International Right of Approach
To determine whether a suspect vessel is stateless, the Coast Guard
relies on the international "right of approach" 99 which permits a
warship to approach an unidentified vessel to determine its nationality.
If a reasonable suspicion remains as to the vessel's nationality, mem-
bers of the warship's crew may board the vessel to determine the
vessel's identity. 100 Once these persons are on board, contraband may
be found in plain view, or conditions may be such as to provide
probable cause to suspect that the vessel is in engaging in activities
in violation of United States law.
If contraband is found or probable cause is established, and the
vessel makes a claim of nationality, that claim will be verified with
the nation claimed to be the flag state. Should that nation deny the
vessel's claim of nationality, the vessel is considered to be stateless
and the United States will exercise jurisdiction. 0 1 If the vessel's claim
of nationality is verified by the foreign state, the United States will
request the flag state's permission to enforce United States drug
interdiction laws. 10 2 The international "right of approach" doctrine
plays an important role in United States interdiction efforts in that
it authorizes a significant number of high seas boardings. 103
3. "Customs Waters" of the United States
Section 1903(c)(1)(D) of the 1986 Act provides that vessels within
United States "customs waters" are subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States. 1°" The Act adopts the definition for "customs waters"
set out in 19 U.S.C. § 14010):
The term "customs waters" means, in the case of a foreign vessel
subject to a treaty or other arrangement between a foreign government
'9 See 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 19, at art. I 10(1)(d); The Mariana Flora,
24 U.S. (11 Wheat) 1, 43 (1826).
,0 United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147, 1149 (11th Cir. 1985) (Under
the "right of approach", Coast Guard boarded suspected smuggling vessel not flying
a flag and with no markings indicating vessel's home port.).
101 46 U.S.C.A. § 1903(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1988).
102 46 U.S.C.A. § 1903(c)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1988).
,03 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Mena, 765 F.2d at 1268 n.12; United States
v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d at 1149.
1- 46 U.S.C.A. § 1903(c)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1988).
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and the United States enabling or permitting the authorities of the
United States to board, examine, search, seize, or otherwise to enforce
upon such vessel upon the high seas the laws of the United States,
the waters within such distance of the coast of the United States as
the said authorities are or may be so enabled or permitted by such
treaty or arrangement, and in the case of every other vessel, the
waters within four leagues of the coast of the United States. 105
In effect, section 1903(c)(1)(D) provides jurisdiction over all vessels
within twelve miles of the baseline of the territorial sea, and over
foreign vessels on the high seas if there is an enabling treaty or
arrangement between the United States and the flag state. 1°6 Within
the normal customs waters, up to twelve miles from the coast, the
United States may exercise jurisdiction over foreign vessels carrying
narcotics without the consent of the flag state.10 7
The doctrine of consensual "customs waters", first introduced in
the 1980 Marijuana on the High Seas Act 0 8 , has consistently been
interpreted to allow jurisdiction over foreign citizens aboard foreign
flag vessels on the high seas. 101 The flag state's consent creates "customs
waters" on the high seas in which United States law may be enforced." l0
Though disguised in the legal fiction of creating "customs waters",
what occurs in essence is an agreement to extend the reach of the laws
of the United States to persons aboard private vessels on the high seas
that fly the flag of the other country. The scope of jurisdiction provided
by section 1903(c)(1)(D) is identical to that under section 1903(c)(1)(C)
[jurisdiction upon the consent of the flag state], except that section
1903 (c)(1)(D) provides jurisdiction within twelve miles of the coast
without the flag state's consent.
The 1980 Marijuana on the High Seas Act adopted by reference the
definition of "customs waters" contained in 19 U.S.C. § 14010)."'
,0, 19 U.S.C.A. § 14010) (West 1982).
01 United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d at 2.
107 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 19, at art. 33.
"1 21 U.S.C. § 955a(c) (West Supp. 1981).
,09 United States. v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d at 1152; United States v. Molinares
Charris, 822 F.2d 1213, 1216-17 (1st Cir. 1987)("A foreign vessel can be constructively
within customs waters, even though it is on the high seas, if there is a 'treaty or
other arrangement between a foreign government and the United States .. ").
110 See, e.g., United States v. Loalza-Vasquez, 735 F.2d 153, 157 (5th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d at 2 ("[I1f a foreign government 'by treaty or
other arrangement' permits the United States to enforce [its laws] upon . . . [a]
vessel upon the high seas the waters around the vessel become 'customs waters,'
and 21 U.S.C. 955a(c) then forbids possession.").
" 21 U.S.C.A. § 955b(a) (West Supp. 1981)(" 'Customs waters' means those
waters as defined in section 1401(j) of Title 19.").
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Unlike the 1980 Act, the 1986 Act references the definitions in 21
U.S.C. § 802112 which section does not include a definition for customs
waters." 3 Therefore, the 1986 Act adopts no special definition of
"customs waters" when the unique definition in 19 U.S.C. § 14010)
is essential to obtaining jurisdiction over foreign vessels on the high
seas under subparagraph (c)(1)(D) of the Act. The significance of this
drafting error is yet unknown.
A defendant indicted under subparagraph (c)(1)(D) could argue that
since the 1986 Act adopts no special definition of "customs waters",
this section provides jurisdiction only in the traditional customs waters
within 12 miles of the coast. The argument does have merit, given
that subparagraph (c)(1)(C) (jurisdiction upon flag state consent) clearly
applies beyond 12 miles and does not require the legal fiction of
creating "customs waters". Of course, the defendant's argument would
provide little relief since the government would re-indict under sub-
paragraph (c)(1)(C). To maintain the ability to exercise jurisdiction on
the high seas in "customs waters" created by treaty or an arrangement,
the government would argue that the intent of Congress was to adopt
the special extraterritorial definition of "customs waters" referenced
in the 1980 Act.
In United States v. Peterson,'4 the Ninth Circuit held that the
protective principle of international law provided for jurisdiction in
extraterritorial "customs waters." As discussed before, however," 5 the
protective principle requires a nexus between the forum and the de-
fendants. For foreign vessels carrying narcotics within 12 miles of the
coast, such a nexus may reasonably be presumed. However, for vessels
on the high seas, a nexus may not be apparent. Jurisdiction over
foreign vessels without a nexus, but where the flag state's consent has
been obtained, would be better justified under the territorial principle.
The territorial principle applies because the flag state has jurisdiction
under the law-of-the-flag theory, and by agreement allows the United
States to exercise jurisdiction over persons on its territory.
H2 46 U.S.C.A. § 1903(i)(West Supp. 1988) ("The definitions in the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. § 802) apply to terms
used in this chapter.").
.3 21 U.S.C.A. § 802 (West 1981).
114 812 F.2d at 494 (upheld jurisdiction over Panamanian vessel in "customs
waters"; "Drug trafficking presents the sort of threat to our nation's ability to
function that merits application of the protective principle of jurisdiction."); See
also United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d at 1154.
" ' See supra note 57.
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In interpreting the 1980 Marijuana on the High Seas Act, the courts
held that the "arrangement" creating "customs waters" could be an
informal agreement with the flag state by cable or telephone." 6 No
treaty need be established before the United States seeks consent via
an informal agreement to board a particular vessel of the flag state."7
Section IV.4. of this paper argues that the use of informal commu-
nications to establish the flag state's consent contravenes international
law.
In United States v. Gonzalez, the Eleventh Circuit held that this
consensual creation of "customs waters" around a specific vessel and
the exercise of jurisdiction over persons thereon does not violate the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." 8 In United States v.
Robinson,"9 the First Circuit upheld the "customs waters" basis of
jurisdiction against a claim that it violated the ex post facto clause of
the Constitution.
4. Flag State Consent
Freedom of transit on the high seas is generally limited to vessels
that fly the flag of a single state. 20 With few exceptions, the flag state
has exclusive jurisdiction over all persons aboard its vessels on the
high seas.' 2' One generally recognized exception to the flag state's
exclusive jurisdiction is consent from the flag state to another state
that allows the second state to exercise jurisdiction over a vessel reg-
istered in the flag state.' 22
116 United States v. Loalza-Vasquez, 735 F.2d 153, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d at 5 ("Case law makes equally clear that an arrangement
can include the Coast Guard's ad hoc request for permission."); Contra United
States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d at 941 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
"7 United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d at 937 ("Accordingly, we hold that nothing
in the Marijuana on the High Seas Act requires a treaty before the United States
may seek an arrangement.").
"8 Id. at 941.
119 843 F.2d at 7 (the ex post facto clause forbids Congress to enact any law which
imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was
committed).
I'l Niam Molvan v. Attorney General for Palestine (The "Asya'), (1948) A.C.
351, 368.
2 1 1958 Convention on the High Seas, supra note 20, at art. 6(l)("ships shall sail
under the flag of one state only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided
for in international treaties or in these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive
jurisdiction on the high seas."); see supra note 43.
122 Id.; RESTATEMENT (Timw) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 522 comment e. (1987); United
States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d at 1154 ("Nothing in international law prohibits
two nations from entering into a treaty, which may be amended by other arrangement,
to extend the customs waters and the reach of the domestic law of one of the
nations into the high seas.").
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Section 1903(c)(1)(C) of the 1986 Act provides that the United States
may exercise jurisdiction over a vessel registered in a foreign nation
if the flag state consents or waives objection to the enforcement of
United States law.' Authority for jurisdiction via the flag state's
consent is grounded in the territorial principle of international law.'4
The foreign vessel is considered the territory of the flag state over
which the flag state may authorize another state to exercise jurisdiction.
The flag state's consent is necessary so that such an exercise will not
violate the flag state's sovereignty.' 25
For the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction over vessels on the high
seas, section 1903(c)(1)(C) is a welcome alternative to the archaic
practice of obtaining jurisdiction through the legal fiction of creating
"customs waters" via an arrangement under section 1903(c)(1)(D).
These two provisions (jurisdiction upon consent [1903(c)(1)(C)]and ju-
risdiction in "customs waters"[1903(c)(1)(D)]), are largely, but not
entirely, duplicative. "Customs waters", as defined for purposes of
subparagraph (c)(1)(D), includes those waters between three and twelve
miles from the coast as well as "customs waters" created pursuant to
an arrangement with the flag state. 2 6 Subparagraph (c)(1)(D), unlike
(c)(1)(C) provides jurisdiction in the traditional customs waters, three
to twelve miles from the coast, without the consent of the flag state.
In 1981, the United States and Great Britain signed an agreement2 7
that permits the United States to board private vessels under the British
flag on designated areas of the high seas when the United States
reasonably believes that the vessel has on board a cargo of drugs for
importation into the United States. There is no requirement for the
advance consent of the United Kingdom for any particular boarding
so long as the United States complies with the terms of the agreement.
123 46 U.S.C.A. § 1903(c)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1988).
124 United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1,4 (1st Cir. 1988)("It is clear, under
international law's territorial principle, that a 'state has jurisdiction to prescribe and
enforce a rule of law in the territory of another state to the extent provided by
international agreement with the other state."' citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FoREIGN RELATIONS 25 (1965).
121 See Note, The Judiciary and Public Policy Considerations of the Marijuana
on the High Seas Act, 10 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. J. 581, 589 n.32 (1986)("The
contractual nature of subsection (c) of the Marijuana Act saves the Act from violating
Article 6 of the High Seas Convention or other tenets of international law regarding
state sovereignty.").
126 19 U.S.C.A. § 14010) (West 1982).
127 Agreement to Facilitate the Interdiction of Vessels Suspected of Trafficking in
Drugs, Nov. 13, 1981, United Kingdom - United States, T.I.A.S. No. 10296.
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The agreement has been held to be a recognized exception to Article
22 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas which allows a warship
to board a merchant ship pursuant to "powers conferred by treaty."'' 28
In the process of enforcing the 1980 Act, various appellate courts
held that informal communications of the flag state's consent are
sufficient to create an arrangement by which the "customs waters"
of the United States are extended to the high seas for the purpose of
enforcing United States interdiction laws on a vessel of the flag state. 129
In the 1986 Act, Congress essentially codified these decisions in section
1903(c)(1):
Consent or waiver of objection by a foreign nation to the enforcement
of United States law by the United States under subparagraph (C)
or (E) of this paragraph may be obtained by radio, telephone, or
similar oral or electronic means, and may be proved by certification
of the Secretary of State or the Secretary's designee.
Congress failed to recognize (or was unconcerned) that the use of
telephone, radio, or other informal (non-treaty) communications to
establish the flag state's consent is not permitted under international
law. Article 22 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas'30 and Article
92 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention state that the flag state
has exclusive jurisdiction over its vessels on the high seas except as
agreed by treaty or other parts of the conventions.'31 Article 110 of
the LOS Convention and Article 22 of the High Seas Convention
permit a warship to board a vessel suspected of carrying narcotics in
accordance with powers conferred by a treaty. Article 110 provides:
1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred
by treaty, a warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign
ship ... is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable
ground for suspecting that: (a) the ship is engaged in piracy; (b) the
ship is engaged in the slave trade; (c) the ship is engaged in unau-
thorized broadcasting . . .; (d) the ship is without nationality; or (e)
though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is,
in reality, of the same nationality as the warship.
128 United States v. Quemener, 789 F.2d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 1986).
129 United States v. Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545,1550 (11th Cir. 1985) ("We hold
that assent to board and search a foreign flag vessel by a duly authorized official
of that foreign government, communicated verbally or in writing to appropriate
United States Department of State personnel, is adequate to meet the terms of
Section 14010)."); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486,493 (9th Cir. 1987).
110 1958 Convention on the High Seas, supra note 20, at art. 22.
1' 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 19, at art. 92.
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Thus, under Article 110, unless the suspect vessel is engaged in one
of the five listed activities, the vessel may not be boarded unless
authority is conferred by a treaty. Neither radio nor teletype com-
munications between the respective governments are a treaty in sat-
isfaction of Article 110.132
International law, as evidenced by Article 110, requires an existing
treaty between two countries before informal communications may be
used to authorize the boarding of a particular vessel. 133 Section 1903(c)(1)
of the 1986 Act, however, provides that consent may be obtained by
informal communications, and the section has no requirement of an
authorizing treaty.' 34 The United States has indicated that it considers
practically all of the non-seabed-mining provisions of the 1982 Law
of the Sea Convention to be declarative of customary international
law.' 35 Apparently, Article 110 is one principle of international law
the United States has chosen not to follow. The United States practice
of obtaining flag state consent informally is also in contravention to
Article 22 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas which the United
States has ratified.1 36
V. CONCLUSION
1. Constitutional Challenge
It is likely that certain applications of section 1903(d) of the Maritime
Drug Law Enforcement Act would not stand up against a Fifth Amend-
ment due process challenge. Section 1903(d) states:
A claim of failure to comply with international law in the enforcement
of this chapter may be invoked solely by a foreign nation, and a
132 Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) ("A treaty is made by the President
and the Senate.").
33 See United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931,941 (11th Cir. 1985) (Hatchett,
J., dissenting).
,34 See id. at 931 (with respect to defendant's claim that an "arrangement" creating
"customs waters" must be pursuant to an existing treaty, the court held: "[N]othing
in the Marijuana on the High Seas Act requires a treaty before the United States
may seek an arrangement.").
"I' See Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983); Sohn, The Law of
The Sea Crisis, 58 ST. Jon's L. REv. 237,265 (1984).
,36 See United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d at 938 ("[T]he Convention is not self-
executing, and... the United States' ratification of the treaty did not 'incorporate
the restrictive language of article 6, which limits the permissible exercise of jurisdiction
to those provided by treaty into its domestic law.. .'."), citing United States v.
Postal, 589 F.2d 862,878 (5th Cir. 1979).
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failure to comply with international law shall not divest a court of
jurisdiction or otherwise constitute a defense to any proceeding under
this chapter.
International law does provide that generally only a state may com-
plain of a violation of international law. 3 7 If however, in the guise
of denying an individual defendant standing to raise an issue of in-
ternational law, section 1903(d) prohibits a challenge of the court's
subject matter jurisdiction, the defendant's Fifth Amendment due proc-
ess rights are violated. Insofar as section 1903(d) operates to prevent
a defendant from challenging whether the court has subject matter
jurisdiction, the statute is unconstitutional.
Section 1903(f) of the Act grants federal district courts jurisdiction
over the offenses listed in the Act:
(f) Jurisdiction and Venue
Any person who violates this section shall be tried in the United
States district court at the point of entry where that person enters
the United States, or in the United States District Court of the District
of Columbia.
Section 1903(f) should be considered along with 18 U.S.C. § 3231138
which gives the federal district courts original jurisdiction over all
offenses against the laws of the United States:
The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction,
exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws
of the United States.
The 1986 Act, however, is unique in that is specifically describes
which vessels are "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."
Section 1903(c)(1) provides:
(1) For purposes of this section, a "vessel subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States" includes -
(A) a vessel without nationality;
(B) a vessel assimilated to a vessel without nationality, in accordance
with ... the 1958 Convention on the High Seas;
(C) a vessel registered in a foreign nation where the flag nation has
consented or waived objection to the enforcement of United States
law by the United States;
(D) a vessel located within the customs waters of the United States;....
"37 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
.38 18 U.S.C.A. § 3231 (West 1985).
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The effect of section 1903(c)(1) is clear. In order for a vessel to be
"subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" and for the court
to have subject matter jurisdiction, the vessel must be a vessel described
in one of the subsections (A through E) of section 1903(c)(1). Due
process requires that the defendant be permitted to challenge whether
his vessel was in fact one described by these subsections.
It is a fundamental principle of jurisdiction that the defendant is
entitled to challenge the court's subject matter jurisdiction3 and that
for a court to act without subject matter jurisdiction is a denial of
due process. 140 Accordingly, the defendant must be allowed to challenge
whether the vessel is a vessel "subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States" under section 1903(c)(1). Often such a challenge will involve
questions of compliance with international law. 14
If the defendant is denied standing to challenge whether the vessel
is (a) a vessel without nationality, or (b) a vessel assimilated to a vessel
without nationality, or (c) a vessel... where the flag state has consented
to the enforcement of United States law ... , under a government
claim that 1903(d) prevents the defendant from challenging compliance
with international law, then the defendant is denied due process.
A recent instance of unconstitutional application of section 1903(d)
is the case of United States v. Biermann, 42 In Biermann, the defendant
was denied standing to challenge whether the United Kingdom con-
sented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the United States under sections
1903(c)(1)(C) or 1903(c)(1)(D) of the 1986 Act. 43 The court held that
according to 1903(d) only the United Kingdom could object that the
United States did not comply with the agreement by which the United
Kingdom granted consent to board a British vessel. In effect, the court
denied the defendant the opportunity to challenge whether the consent
requirement of 1903 (c)(1)(C) or (c)(1)(D) was complied with so as to
make the vessel "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." In
effect, the defendant was denied due process. The defendant in Bier-
mann, however, failed to argue that he was denied the opportunity
to challenge subject matter jurisdiction, and this issue was not addressed
139 United States v. Rogers, 23 F.2d 658 (D.C. Ark. 1885).
,40 United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F.Supp. at 1347, n.10.
11 46 U.S.C.A. § 1903(c)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1988) (jurisdiction under this section
requires the court to determine whether the vessel is assimilated to a vessel without
nationality in accordance with the 1958 Convention on the High Seas).
142 678 F.Supp. 1437 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
1 Id. at 1442.
[Vol. 19:119
RuSK AWARD
by the court. The defendant would be entitled to challenge jurisdiction
after conviction by writ of habeas corpus.'"
Congress has the power to prevent defendants from litigating issues
of compliance with international law. However, it is unconstitutional
for Congress to prevent defendants from challenging a court's subject
matter jurisdiction.
When the defendant is denied standing to challenge violations of
international law, he or she will rarely obtain relief since the flag state
is likely to be hesitant to challenge the narcotics interdiction efforts
of the United States. Nations that maintain relations with the United
States across the diplomatic and economic spectrum may overlook
violations of international law in order not to endanger existing ben-
eficial arrangements.
2. The Process of Expanding Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The United States Congress and the federal courts have developed
a boot-strap process by which they act in concert to justify the ex-
pansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction beyond the limits of customary
international law. This boot-strap process is simple: Congress passes
a law expanding jurisdiction which is of questionable validity under
international law. The courts then interpret the law, stretching inter-
national legal principles of jurisdiction, to aggressively expand juris-
diction in accordance with the intent of Congress. Then, in a third
step, Congress relies on these strained federal court interpretations of
international law as authority for clarifying and revising the law to
provide even greater extraterritorial reach for the jurisdiction.
Through this circular process, the Congress and the courts unilat-
erally, and in a vacuum, expand the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
United States beyond the reach permitted by customary international
law. From the perspective of an international law jurist, the United
States is building a jurisdictional house of cards that is no stronger
than its foundation, which foundation is built on the unsteady grounds
of strained interpretations of international law.
An example of this process is the United States' position that informal
communications may be used to obtain the flag state's consent to
board a foreign vessel. 145 In the 1980 Marijuana On The High Seas
Act, Congress outlawed the possession of narcotics on vessels within
"customs waters" as defined in 19 U.S.C. § 14010). Federal appellate
-" United States v. Anderson, 60 F.Supp. 649 (W.D. Wash. 1945).
.45 46 U.S.C.A. § 1903(c)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
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courts approved this concept of consensual "customs waters" and
further held that the "arrangement" creating "customs waters" may
be by teletype or telephone communications.14 Then, in the third step
of the process, the 1986 Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act directly
provided that the consent of a foreign nation to the enforcement of
United States law may be obtained by radio, telephone, or similar oral
or electronic means. 47
As a result of this boot-strap process, the United States engages in
a practice which contravenes international law, 48 and for authority
supporting the validity of which the Congress and the courts refer to
each other. Other examples of this circular process include (1) the
judicial and congressional development of the law of jurisdiction over
stateless vessels between the 1980 and 1986 Acts, 49 and (2) Section
1903(d) of the 1986 Act which paves the way for courts to authorize
jurisdiction over the crew members of stateless and foreign vessels
under a strained interpretation of the protective principle. 50
This authority-creating circle becomes a whirlwind given the intense
political interest in appearing to be "tough on drugs" (as evidenced
by the 1988 presidential and congressional campaigns). Congressmen
are elected and judges are appointed with the expectation that they
will promote the aggressive enforcement of drug laws. It is doubtful
that the Congress will show respect for established principles of in-
ternational jurisdiction in its efforts to stop illegal drugs from entering
the country. Likewise, judges are subject to political and popular
pressure to enforce drug laws rather than limit these laws'-effect in
respect for international law.
In the Western Hemisphere, the United States has largely had a free
hand in unilaterally expanding extraterritorial jurisdiction because of
(1) the prominence and power of the United States relative to Central
and South American countries, and (2) the general desire among nations
to stop illegal narcotics trafficking. Though the United States may be
losing the "war on drugs", it has apparently won the battle of ex-
panding jurisdiction to reach drug traffickers on the high seas. Whether
it is wise to expand jurisdiction in contravention of customary inter-
national law is a debatable issue.
146 Supra note 129.
1 46 U.S.C.A. § 1903(c)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
148 Supra notes 133-136.
149 See supra section IV.2.
150 Supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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3. Argument Against Unilateral Expansion of Jurisdiction
The United States' practices of exercising jurisdiction over crew
members of stateless vessels where no nexus is present and of using
informal communications to obtain flag state consent are in apparent
contravention of customary international law. The international law
of jurisdiction allows nations to extend territorial control in comity
with other nations. Only through cooperation and agreement on the
scope of extraterritorial power can a predictable and stable set of rules
be established. In 1817, the English High Court of Admiralty stated
that "a nation is not justified in assuming rights that do not belong
to her merely because she means to apply them to a laudable pur-
pose." 5I This admonition clearly applies to the United States' unilateral
expansion of high seas jurisdiction.
To the extent that its practices are in violation of international law,
the United States is placing its national concerns above the need for
an effective international regime capable of solving a multitude of
problems. In addition, a dangerous precedent has been established for
other nations which may choose to extend their control of the high
seas for a less noble purpose than narcotics interdiction.
At the least, certain applications of the United States law of high
seas jurisdiction are in apparent conflict with international law. The
exact extent to which United States practices and international law
conflict remains to be decided. The benefits gained from obtaining
jurisdiction over drug traffickers, in apparent conflict with international
law, are discounted as other nations view the United States as unwilling
to comply with customary international law. Comity requires a nation
to comply with international law in order to enjoy the benefits of this
law. The effectiveness of international law and international organi-
zations, as well as the long-term effectiveness of national interdiction
efforts, would improve if the United States took the time and effort
to expand jurisdiction without creating real or apparent conflicts with
international law.
Jeffrey D. Stieb
" Le Louis, 2 Dods. 210, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464, High Court of Admiralty (1817)
("Nor is it to be argued that because other nations approve the ultimate purpose,
they must therefore submit to every measure which any one state or its subjects
may inconsiderately adopt for its attainment.").
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